The statement of the President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, on the possibility of changing the course of the Ibar River should be seen beyond its technical dimension. On August 9, 2026, the President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, stated that Serbia had invited experts, engineers and representatives of the construction sector to examine the possibility of changing the course of the Ibar River. He linked this possibility directly to developments in northern Kosovo, saying that “we will see what the Albanians will do and how they will behave.” Vučić said that Serbia had “different reasons” for changing the course of the river.
He then returned to this topic by mentioning the area of Ribaric and Lake Ujman/Gazivoda, stating that he did not know “if [the lake] will be there tomorrow or where it will be.” Although he later claimed that he did not threatened no one and that it was only about the management of water flows in the territory of Serbia, his formulation clearly linked the hydrotechnical issue to political developments in Kosovo.
The statements were made in a tense context following the action of the Kosovo authorities to demolish unauthorized constructions near Lake Ujman. Pristina has treated these constructions as a violation of the law, while Belgrade has presented the actions as pressure on Serbs and their property. For this reason, Vučić's statement was not perceived simply as a hydrotechnical proposal, but as a political threat related to the management of water resources. Moreover, the Ibri is a transboundary river that originates in Montenegro, passes through Serbia, enters Kosovo and then returns to Serbia, while supplying Lake Ujman.
This is where the hybrid dimension of the declaration comes into play. According to the European Union, hybrid threats can include information manipulation, cyberattacks, economic influence, political maneuvering, coercive diplomacy and military threats, used in combination to weaken a state or institution. The EU also considers critical infrastructure, including the water sector, as one of the areas that must be protected against hybrid threats.
In this sense, Vučić’s statement is important not only for what can be done technically, but for the effect that the threat creates. He did not just say that Serbia was studying an engineering project; he linked the change in flow to the behavior of “Albanians.” So water appears as a political lever: if developments in northern Kosovo continue in a direction unacceptable to Belgrade, Serbia warns that it may consider intervening in a source on which an important part of Kosovo’s water and energy system depends.
Reactions from Kosovo, Albania and the international community
In Kosovo, the statement was seen as threatening. The acting president, Albulena Haxhiu, described the idea as "absurd", "threatening" and "chauvinistic", stressing that the Iber-Lepenc system and Lake Ujman are vital for water supply, energy, agriculture and the lives of hundreds of thousands of citizens. The acting Minister of Environment, Fitore Pacolli, also stated that water resources cannot be used as instrument of threat, pressure or destabilization.
Meanwhile, Professor Alban Kuriqi APPRECIATED that partial diversion of water is technically possible, but would require dams, canals or tunnels, large investments and detailed hydrological, geological and environmental studies. A large and long-term reduction in flows would affect Kosovo's water supply, energy, industry and agriculture.
From Albania, the Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs, Ferit Hoxha, stated that water cannot be used as instrument of political pressure or as a means of punishment and stressed Albania's support for Kosovo's right to security, sustainable development and protection of water resources. Serbian Foreign Minister Marko Djuric responded by claiming that Serbia would decide for yourself for the management of its natural resources. Prime Minister Edi Rama reacted by describing this approach as “political folklore”, saying that the Ibri will continue to flow “according to geography and not according to folklore”. Gjuric, responds to Rama, saying that “…[Ibri] is not part of the Albanian river system.". The clash showed that the Ibar issue turned within a few days into a diplomatic debate between Belgrade and Tirana.
The European Union and the United States also reacted to the statements. The EU warnthat statements about possible changes in the flow of rivers do not contribute to the normalization of Kosovo-Serbia relations and that such actions should be avoided.
The US State Department emphasized that peace and stability in the Western Balkans are priorities for the US and that the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia is a necessary part of this process. There was also criticism within Serbia.
There have also been reactions in Serbia from experts and those familiar with the issue. Hydrotechnical expert Jovan Despotovic argued that the Ibri cannot be treated as a water resource that can be managed unilaterally, while Dušan Janjić described Vučić's rhetoric as dangerous and warned that using the issue as an "ideological-propaganda mantra" could increase tensions.
Water as critical infrastructure and instrument of hybrid warfare
In the case of the Ibar, the potential for this pressure is particularly high due to the role of Lake Ujman. The reservoir is part of the Ibar-Lepenc system, which is important for the water supply, agriculture, industry and energy system of Kosovo. According to the analysis of expert Alban Kuriqi, a large and long-term change in flows could affect the production of hydroelectric power and create problems in the division of water between population supply, energy, industry, agriculture and ecological flow.
This makes Ujman a typical example of critical infrastructure with chain effects. The interruption or reduction of a water source does not only affect water supply. It can affect energy, industrial production, agriculture and public services. Precisely for this reason, The EU It includes the water, energy, transport and health sectors in the framework of protecting critical infrastructure from hybrid threats.
This logic is also illustrated by attack on the Iber-Lepenc canal in November 2024. The explosion in Zubin Potok damaged a part of the vital infrastructure related to the water supply and functioning of the energy system of Kosovo. Pristina has linked the attack to Serbia, while Belgrade has denied the accusations. Although responsibility for the attack remains a separate issue, the target of the attack shows the strategic importance of water infrastructure: a single channel can create consequences for energy, water and the economy.
This is not the first time that Ujman/Gazivoda has been used in Serbian political discourse as a strategic asset. In 2015, Vučić declared that “we do not give up Gazivoda", while in 2016 it presented the hydro system as strategically important for Serbs in northern KosovoIn 2018, Ujmani/Gazivoda was one of the main points of his visit to northern Kosovo. After Hashim Thaçi's visit to the lake that same year, tensions rose as long after Thaçi's visit, was shot in the restaurant where he drank coffee. Then, several dozen members of the Kosovo Special Forces ROSU stood around the lake and hydroelectric power plant of Ujmani/Gazivoda, and Vučić ordered the Serbian army to be on high alert. These episodes show that Ujmani/Gazivoda has long been part of a political and security dimension, not just water management.
Gazivoda was among the issues included in the Washington Agreement, which Belgrade and Pristina signed on September 4, 2020 in the United States of America (USA). The agreement provided for that, in collaboration with the US Department of Energy, a study be conducted regarding the sharing of the lake as a source of energy and water.
The developments following the attack on the Iber-Lepenc canal also reinforce this context. In 2024, Vučić said that the idea of changing the course of the Iber had existed for decades, but stated that he himself had been against it because he did not want “nature to be used for political purposes”. In August 2026, however, he said that experts had already been invited to examine the possibility of changing the course and linked this to developments in northern Kosovo. So, even without claiming that we have a confirmed plan for the realization of the project, we have an important change in the political function of the rhetoric on water.
Kakhovka: when water became a strategic weapon
One of the closest examples to the logic that appears in the Ibar case is the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam in Ukraine on June 6, 2023 by the Russian military. The destruction of the dam on the Dnipro River caused massive flooding, infrastructure damage, and a water supply crisis, while also affecting agriculture and energy production. NATO analyses-that they treat the destruction of the dam as a blow to critical infrastructure with simultaneous military, energy, water, economic and humanitarian consequences.
In military terms, the flood the terrain conditions also changed and complicated a possible Ukrainian offensive along the Dnieper.
The Kakhovka case thus shows that water control can be used to produce multidimensional consequences: a hydrotechnical facility can be simultaneously an energy infrastructure, a water source, an agricultural asset, and an important element of the military terrain.