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[ ARTICLE ]

Construction of Serbian narratives about Kosovo through statements by a Serbian government minister

FESTIM RIZANAJ

In an interview given on July 12, 2026 on the show "Neispricano" of the Serbian television Kurir TV, Snezhana Paunović, Minister of Public Administration and Local Self-Government in the Government of Serbia, has promoted several narratives about Kosovo, the 1998–1999 war and the post-war period.

During the interview, Paunović articulated claims that present Serbs as the main victims of developments in Kosovo, delegitimize the role of the international community and relativize the policies of the Slobodan Milošević regime. These statements build an interpretive framework where Serbia is presented as the protector of Serb rights and the guarantor of stability, while Kosovo Albanians and international institutions are presented as factors responsible for the alleged insecurity and alleged ethnic divisions. In this interview, she stated that if she had been in Milošević's place in 1998, she would have ethnically cleansed Kosovo.

Narrative 1: Kosovo is historical and eternal Serbian land

The dominant narrative of the interview is that Kosovo constitutes an inseparable part of Serbia, while its independence is considered a temporary and imposed state. Kosovo is presented as a “Serbian holy land”, inextricably linked to Serbian historical, national and religious identity. In this context, its return to Serbian sovereignty is treated as an inevitable historical process.

"There is much left, but above all the fact that this is Serbian land remains. And the belief that there is no Serb who would be able to sign that it is called differently… Kosovo and Metohija will again be part of Serbia and a place for all those who want to live there, with the awareness that they must respect this sacred Serbian land… I will continue to remind generations to never forget how sacred this is for us and that it is ours… No occupation lasts forever, so this one will not last either."

Narrative 2: Albanians have been developing a project for the ethnic cleansing of Serbs for decades

The interview further promotes the idea that the conflict in Kosovo did not begin in the late 1990s, but is the result of a long-term Albanian project to create a “Greater Albania” and gradually eliminate the Serbian presence. According to her, this project began with the League of Prizren and was carried out through the purchase of Serbian property, the creation of ethnically homogeneous areas, and the destruction of Serbian historical heritage.

“I don’t know if it ever ended. Since the League of Prizren and their strategic documents for the creation of Greater Albania, that war has never ceased… Immediately after World War II they strategically bought Serbian properties, creating ethnically pure areas in Kosovo and Metohija, which later became bases for the KLA… With full consciousness they worked to eradicate the authenticity, history and identity of the Serbs.”

Narrative 3: The KLA was a terrorist organization and Serbia waged a legitimate war against terrorism

One of the central narratives is the presentation of the KLA exclusively as a terrorist organization, while the operations of Serbian forces are described as legitimate measures to protect citizens and combat terrorism. The operation in Prekaz is also justified by claiming that Adem Jashari used his family as a shield. In this context, the war crimes and massacres committed by Serbian forces against Albanian civilians are either relativized or completely rewritten. The attack on the Jashari family in Prekaz is presented as the fault of the victims and the KLA leader themselves, absolving the state of responsibility for the murder of women and children. Similarly, the world-famous massacres, such as that of Recak, which served as a turning point for NATO intervention, are described as mere “improvisations” and media fabrications of Western and Albanian propaganda.

"Adem Jashari was a man who, with his terrorist group, made movement between Peja and Pristina impossible. On that road, Serbs were killed and families were attacked... Why was Adem Jashari's family killed? Because he was hiding behind it. He sacrificed them... We have serious victims of those terrorist attacks. From the first moment it was an organized army."

"Let's not talk about Racak. Danica Marinković is alive so she can say and speak out loud how much improvisation she was alone."

Narrative 4: Serbia was a victim of international propaganda and NATO intervened based on manipulations

The interview builds a narrative that NATO’s military intervention against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was not the result of human rights violations or war crimes, but of a coordinated propaganda campaign against Serbia. Paunović claims that the main events that served as justification for the international intervention, including the poisoning of Albanian schoolchildren in 1990 and the Recak massacre in 1999, were fabricated or manipulated to create a narrative that legitimized NATO bombing. Through this approach, responsibility for the intervention is shifted from the actions of the then Serbian regime to the media, international actors, and Western institutions, who are presented as part of an organized campaign against Serbia.

"Then we had the situation when it was claimed that they were suddenly poisoned by the water that we all drank together... That image was sent to the world as completely credible evidence of the poisoning of Albanian children in Kosovo. Step by step this led to the bombing of a sovereign state... None of what happened as a motive for NATO's intervention was real history... Let's not even talk about Recak, what a great improvisation that was."

Narrative 5: Serbs are the main victims of the war in Kosovo

This narrative presents Serbs as the main and ongoing victims of the war in Kosovo, building the perception that the Serb community is still living in a state of insecurity similar to the period of the 1998–1999 war. Through allegations of kidnappings, organized expulsions, and constant danger from Albanians, the narrative aims to create the idea that there is a deliberate process to make Kosovo “ethnically empty” of Serbs. This framework of collective victimization shifts the focus from the complexity of the conflict and the responsibilities of the parties, presenting the Serb community only as the object of violence and systematic pressure.

“Kidnappings, forced entry into homes and sending people to unknown destinations began… The people living in Kosovo and Metohija today live as if it were still 1998 in terms of security, or even worse, as if it were July 1999… They are exposed to the possibility that any local Albanian fool will invent that he has participated in something… Because the goal is for Kosovo and Metohija to remain ethnically empty.”

Narrative 6: KFOR and the international community are occupiers of Kosovo

In this narrative, KFOR and the international community are presented as external actors who have imposed control over Kosovo, being described as “occupiers” rather than as international missions established after the end of the war. Through an interpretation that characterizes the NATO intervention in 1999 as military aggression and the international presence as its continuation, the narrative aims to delegitimize the role of these actors in the post-war period. It constructs the idea that the departure of KFOR and international institutions would mark the end of an “occupation”, presenting the current political and security order in Kosovo as imposed rather than the result of post-conflict developments.

“In fact, this was a land occupation of Kosovo, which they failed to achieve through the attack that they later called ‘Merciful Angel’… They passed through Koshara thanks to the mentors who helped them from the beginning… We will wait for KFOR to leave, and with it perhaps all those who came with it. No occupation lasts forever, so this one will not last either. We have waited five hundred years for the Turks to leave, so we will wait for KFOR to leave, and with it all those who came with it. Kosmet will again be part of Serbia and a space for all those who want to live in it while respecting that sacred Serbian land.”

Narrative 7: Slobodan Milosevic was the defender of the Serbs and was unjustly demonized

Paunović presents Slobodan Milošević as a leader who protected the interests and security of Serbs in Kosovo, relativizing or denying responsibility for his policies during the 90s. By portraying him as a figure unjustly misinterpreted and “demonized” by international actors, the narrative aims to replace his image as responsible for repressive policies with that of a defender of the Serbian community. It constructs a distinction between “his policies” and “personal mistakes,” minimizing the consequences of state actions under his leadership and challenging historical interpretations that link Milošević’s regime to the wars and crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia.

"For the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija, this was not just a sentence that someone said, but a promise that Slobodan Milosevic fulfilled... From the greatest factor of peace and stability in the Balkans after Dayton, he turned into the 'butcher of the Balkans'... Slobodan Milosevic's policy was not wrong. Maybe he made mistakes as a result of his character, but his policy was not wrong."

Narrative 8: Albanians committed ethnic cleansing against Serbs after 1999

Following the end of the war in Kosovo, Paunović’s narrative constructs the post-1999 period as a phase of organized ethnic cleansing of Serbs by Albanians, explaining the displacement of the Serb community as a direct consequence of violence, intimidation, and destruction of property. Drawing on personal accounts of the loss of homes, property, and family memories, the narrative seeks to create an image of a community systematically expelled from its traditional settlements. Through this interpretation, it reduces the complexity of the post-war period to a one-sided victim-perpetrator relationship, overlooking other historical factors and the many developments that influenced population movements after the conflict.

"The kidnappings, the breaking into houses, and the sending of people in unknown directions began... My father experienced the fact that he had to leave very badly... I don't have any photos from my childhood. The curtains remained on the windows; we just closed the apartment and left... When I returned after five or six years, there wasn't even a tap left in the apartment... Like termites, they had taken everything."

Narrative 9: Only Serbia guarantees coexistence and rights for Albanians

Paunović presents Serbia as the sole guarantor of stability, well-being and interethnic coexistence in relation to Kosovo Albanians. Through claims that Albanians, especially the younger generations, have more trust in Serbian institutions than in Kosovo’s, the narrative aims to delegitimize Kosovo’s statehood and institutions, presenting it as an entity incapable of providing services and security. At the same time, it builds a positive image of Serbia as a more functional and inclusive system, using isolated examples of service use in Belgrade to support the claim that Albanians also recognize Serbia as the most reliable authority.

"The younger generations are no longer so fascinated by the ideas of Greater Albania… They love Belgrade and know that life is good there. They use the benefits to be treated in Belgrade. They have more faith in the health system in Belgrade than in the one in Pristina… That is why Kosovo and Metohija will always remain Serbian, because even those who belong to the people who took it have more faith in Serbia than in the so-called independent Kosovo."

Narrative 10: Serbia has refrained, while it should have used much harsher measures, “ethnic cleansing”

Paunović presents Serbia in the 90s as an actor that showed “restraint” and did not take sufficient measures against Albanians in Kosovo, suggesting that state policy should have been even harsher. Through the idea of ​​“ethnic cleansing” and the presentation of the expulsion of the population as a justifiable measure, the narrative aims to normalize the repressive actions of the then regime. It redefines violence and campaigns against the civilian population as legitimate measures against “terrorists”, thereby avoiding the responsibility of Serbian state structures for serious human rights violations and crimes committed during the war in Kosovo.

"If I were Slobodan Milosevic, I would have ethnically cleansed Kosovo in 1998. And this is the harshest qualification I have ever uttered in my life, but not in a way to liquidate them as they are trying to ethnically cleanse Kosovo, but in a way that anyone who does not feel like a resident of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should leave it and go to their native country. While those who had chosen terrorist actions would be eliminated in the way terrorism is usually fought."

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