Year 2022 told that misinformation and disinformation are not declining phenomena. On the contrary, information disorder is spreading, changing form, depending on events and developments that are more current, and adopting new digital tools, applications, and platforms.
While disinformation and misinformation about the health field and Covid-19 dominated 2020 and 2021, this year, misinformation content continues, but now about the field of global security.
Unlike the disinformation content about Covid-19, whose genesis and purpose were often unclear, these security content mostly had a common source — the state propaganda apparatusWhen Russia militarily invaded Ukraine in February of this year, state propaganda, as a coordinated campaign to create and distribute disinformation content, became more present and frequent.
Disinformation materials about the events that preceded and followed this development dominated the digital space worldwide, including in Albanian.
In addition to events related to Ukraine, the digital space in Kosovo was also permeated by disinformation about other topics, mainly about tensions in northern Kosovo, the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, or inflation.
The impact of developments in Ukraine
The war in Ukraine, in addition to changing the course of world geopolitical events, also changed the interest of audiences. The events surrounding Ukraine became the epicenter of developments. This is due to the fact that almost every other global development was related to this war, from the fear of starting a third world war to the increase in prices of local products. This was also seen during our daily work on the fact-checking platform — Hibrid.info, which I led.
The International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) created a global database of fact-checks of misinformation related to the events in Ukraine. Hibrid.info, as a member of this network, used the collected data to compile the first report at that time about these disinformation and misinformation contents that were being created and distributed in the digital space, with special emphasis on the Albanian language.
While dealing with this content, researchers identified the tendency of creators and distributors of misinformation content to compare events in Ukraine with those in the Balkans, especially Kosovo.
According to the findings, excluding the initial period (a few days) of the Russian occupation of Ukraine, pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian disinformation consolidated with a relatively equal spread during the first month. Pro-Russian propaganda content mainly contained offensive labels against the Ukrainian government, calling them “Nazis” and accusing them of violence against citizens of the Russian community in Ukraine. Propaganda content was also present on Ukrainian state institutions’ social media channels, which published unverified materials for the successes of the Ukrainian army on the war fronts.
Russian propaganda also brought another narrative during this time. Part of this narrative was the efforts of Russia's political and institutional leaders, including President Vladimir Putin himself, to put their decision to invade, initially, the separatist regions of Donetsk and Luhansk in Ukraine, and NATO's military intervention in Kosovo in 1999 in the same context, although such a parallel does not hold since NATO's intervention in Kosovo occurred to stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.
The same content was largely published by online media and other publishers of content in the Albanian language.
Internal security events
Misinformation and disinformation in this area began with the parallels drawn between events in Ukraine and those in the Balkans and Kosovo in the first quarter. They continued in the second half of the year with topics around the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, several incidents in the Serb-majority regions of Kosovo, and culminated with recent events related to the Kosovo government's decision to reciprocate with Serbia on freedom of movement.
Disinformation, using these sensitive events, occurred primarily through the construction of political narratives by senior institutional and political representatives in Serbia.
The decision of the Government of Kosovo on reciprocity towards Serbia for travel documents and the removal of license plates issued by Serbia, scheduled to enter into force on August 1 of this year, was accompanied by tensions in the north of the countryOn July 31, the day before the date on which this decision was scheduled to come into force, groups of Serbian citizens blocked the roads connecting the two Kosovo-Serbia border crossings. Also during this period pati misinforming media products.
The tension of the situation also arose as a result of disinformation, the main source of which was the media and certain groups on Russian and Serbian social media platforms. Despite warnings issued by Kosovo institutions to be careful in consuming information from dubious sources, these channels were put to use for disinformation with content posted and shared on social media.
The disinformation narrative that seemed to be coordinated between Serbian state institutions and media close to the government in Serbia was followed by several other fabricated news. News based on several Serbian institutional reactions, which were published during August and September, with claim that actions were being coordinated to expel local Serbs from their settlements in Kosovo by Pristina institutions, were part of the next narrative. The basis for these claims were the numerous communiqués published by the Office for Kosovo of the Government of Serbia during this period.
Disinformation will not disappear
It is not yet possible to say whether 2022 will be marked as the year in which the most disinformation and misinformation content was spread so far, as other events are expected to occur, both domestically and globally, that will inspire more inaccurate content.
In Kosovo, topics about security, politics, and social issues resurface time and again.
The topic of visa liberalization has now been re-updated. Political developments, meetings of senior political officials of the European Union from the Commission, the European Parliament and the Council during the months of June and October, caused many Kosovo media outlets to report on the possibilities of visa liberalization. Also, dubious portals and other creators and distributors of such content published articles and posts that falsely claimed positive developments in this regard, while others used old statements by European officials and institutional representatives in Kosovo on this issue, in an attempt to present them as new news and developments.
Meanwhile, the increase in the prices of basic products was also a topic that was misused by disinformation creators, falsely claiming an increase in the prices of basic products such as bread, oil and milk. Previous decisions of Kosovo institutions on aid for various social categories were republished with the aim of presenting them as current news, such as the allocation of financial resources for certain categories.
News about the shortage and rising price of electricity, largely determined by the course of events in Ukraine, will continue to be an inspiration for disinformation.
This shows us that disinformation and misinformation are unlikely to go away. In fact, this phenomenon is spreading to include almost every area of life that is considered of vital interest to people. As fact-checkers combat this phenomenon on a daily basis, one thing is known — information disorder will not disappear, we will just have to learn to live with it.
Article written by Shkelzen Osmani for Regional SUSTAINABILITY program, funded by the European Union.