KFOR’s announcement of a gradual “optimization” of the forces, which includes handing over some security responsibilities to the Kosovo Police at key points, such as the bridge over the Ibar River and the Deçan Monastery, has become the starting point for an intensive narrative campaign by official Belgrade, the Serbian List, and the Serbian media. For KFOR, this process is associated with the improvement of the security situation and the gradual adaptation of its presence to the circumstances on the ground. In Serbian discourse, however, it has been framed as an “abandonment” of Serbs, the creation of a security vacuum, and a new danger for the Serbian population in Kosovo.
The narrative is constructed on several interconnected levels: first by creating a sense of alarm, then by delegitimizing the assessment of KFOR and the international mission itself, and then by portraying the Kosovo Police as a source of insecurity. To concretize this claim, various cases and incidents are placed in the same frame and presented as evidence of a systematic “terror” against Serbs.
"Alarm" and the narrative of uncertainty
The narrative began with a dramatic language of crisis. The tabloid Informer published the headline “Upaljen alarm u Beogradu! Opasna igra na severu KiM” (“Alarm goes off in Belgrade! Dangerous game in the north”), presenting the change in KFOR’s presence not as a technical process, but as a development that directly endangers the security of Serbs.
At this stage, an important role was played by representatives of the Serbian List, who disputed the international assessment that the security situation had improved. Igor Simić raised a question mark based on this assessment, stating: “The question arises on the basis of which analyses KFOR came to the conclusion that the situation on the ground is stable…”
This statement is important for narrative construction because it not only challenges KFOR’s decision, but also the premise on which it was made. By questioning the assessment that the situation is stable, it creates the perception that KFOR’s withdrawal is taking place at a time when, according to the Serbian claim, the danger still exists.
This creates the basis for the narrative of “abandonment” and for the argument that the Serbian community is being left without protection.
The KFOR issue: from “optimization” to a narrative of mistrust
A main pillar of the narrative was built through official meeting of the Serbian List delegation, led by its leader Zlatan Elek, with the KFOR commander, Turkish General Özkan Ulutaş. The meeting was used by the Serbian side to articulate opposition to the reduction of the international presence and to question KFOR's assessments of the security situation.
Elek expressed “strong opposition” to any reduction in the international presence. In this way, the Serbian List’s position was not limited to criticism of an operational decision, but presented as opposition to the very process of gradually transferring security responsibilities to local institutions.
In the same context, Milan Radojevic, mayor of North Mitrovica, framed the meeting as an attempt to show KFOR that its assessments do not match the reality on the ground. He stated: “The reality on the ground does not correspond to the reports and assessments that come from KFOR.”
This statement reinforces an important element of the narrative: KFOR's institutional reports are presented as inaccurate or insufficient, while Serbian political actors are positioned as an alternative source of "reality on the ground."
On the other hand, KFOR Commander Özkan Ulutaş stressed that the process is related to the improvement of the security situation. However, the Serbian side also used the statement that the process "can be reversed" in case of worsening of the situation. This element was used to keep it alive the narrative of the potential crisis: even if KFOR is reducing its presence due to stabilization, the very possibility of a return to the process is interpreted as evidence that the risk remains real.
The narrative of distrust also expanded into direct accusations of KFOR bias. Milovan Drecun stated that KFOR's decisions are "fully in line with Albin Kurti's demands", portraying the international mission as an actor that is not maintaining its neutrality. Drecun specifically targeted Turkish commander Özkan Ulutaş, stating: "It is clear that since the Turkish general is in charge of KFOR, KFOR behaves in a very biased manner..."
This narrative was also linked to Resolution 1244, which is used to argue that KFOR should remain the main guarantor of security and that increasing the role of the Kosovo Police is not acceptable.
Along the same lines, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić framed the meeting between the Chief of the General Staff of Serbia, Milan Mojsilović, and the KFOR commander as "the worst meeting so far", adding: "Just don't pretend like you're for dialogue, because you're not."
Through these statements, criticism shifts from the concrete issue of force optimization to a broader narrative of distrust towards NATO and international actors.
Delegitimization of the Kosovo Police
Another central pillar of the narrative is the portrayal of Kosovo Police not as an institution responsible for order and security, but as a source of threat and pressure against the Serbian community.
This element is particularly important because the gradual transfer of responsibilities from KFOR to the Kosovo Police makes the latter the actor that, according to the Serbian narrative, will gain more control over sensitive points. Consequently, the delegitimization of the police also serves to delegitimize the process of optimizing KFOR itself.
In this framework, the Kosovo Police is presented as “torture facility", while her individual actions are interpreted as part of a broader policy of pressure on Serbs. This creates a simple narrative formula: the more responsibilities are transferred to the Kosovo Police, the greater the danger to Serbs.
Incidents as “evidence” of the narrative
To support this claim, various cases are included in the same narrative framework. They are not treated simply as individual incidents, but are used to create a general picture of insecurity and pressure on the Serbian community.
The case of Nenad Rashkovic: The case of Nenad Rashkovic, from the village of Dren, municipality of Zubin Potok, was intensively used by Belgrade to build the narrative of the “brutality” of the Kosovo Police. According to the version published by the Serbian side, Rashkovic was arrested, taken to a forest area, tied to a tree and beaten with a rubber hose. During the Serbian List press conference, Zlatan Elek gave a chronological description of the incident, which differed in some details from the version presented in the Serbian List communiqué on August 11.
According to the version that Elek said Rashkovic told him, members of the Kosovo Police beat him during a search of his house and demanded that he surrender his weapon. Then, according to him, the officers left and returned several hours later, when they allegedly took him to a forest, tied him to a tree and beat him again with a water hose.
In the end, according to Rashkovic's testimony, relayed by Elek, he returned to the main road, and was allegedly threatened that the police would return again.
Deputy Director of the Kosovo Police for the Northern Region, Veton Elshani, stated that the police, up until that moment, had no information that its members had beaten any person during police actions in the Zubin Potok area.
It is also announced that the Kosovo Police Inspectorate (KPI) an investigation has been launched preliminary ex officio investigation regarding the claims of Nenad Rashkovic, from the village of Dren in the municipality of Zubin Potok, that members of the Kosovo Police used excessive force against him.
The case gained political weight through statements by Miloš Vučević, leader of the SNS and advisor to the Serbian president. He described the incident as si "the work of the hands of the executioners", declaring: ""Our people are suffering a horrific terror in Kosovo and Metohija. I expect an urgent response to these crimes."
Vučević's involvement shifts the case from the individual to the political and international level, using it as an argument for seeking an external response to Kosovo's institutions.
This narrative was amplified by the head of the Office for Kosovo, Petar Petkovic, who published photographs of Rashkovic's injuries and stated: “These are the images of Kurti's 'democracy' – bruises, hematomas and animal abuse.”
The chairwoman of the Serbian Parliament's Kosovo and Metohija Committee, Danijela Nikolic, also used the opportunity to shift responsibility from Kosovo institutions to the international presence. In a statement, she described Rashkovic's injuries as "a shame for KFOR, EULEX and the EU", demanding that these institutions show what concrete measures will be taken and who will be held accountable.
The incident in Lipjan: Another incident used to reinforce the narrative was the placing of KLA and Albanian flags on the fence of an Orthodox church in Lipjan. The Serbian side framed it as “new attack on Serbization"and as evidence of the danger to Serbian religious sites.
The Chancellery for Kosovo described the incident as an act of "intimidation of the believing people", linking it to allegations of pressure and expulsion of Serbs.
Although the Kosovo Police arrested the suspects (one under the influence of alcohol), the Serbian narrative presented it as evidence that churches are in danger without KFOR.
Water/Waterworks: The same framework also includes shares in the Gazivoda (Ujman) area, including the demolition of unauthorized buildings. The actions of Kosovo institutions were presented in some Serbian sources as a “continuation of terror” and an attempt to exert pressure on Serbs.
Here the mechanism of selecting and linking incidents clearly appears: police actions, administrative issues, incidents in religious buildings, and allegations of mistreatment merge into a single narrative, according to which Kosovo institutions are pursuing a coordinated policy of pressure against Serbs.
Overall, the Serbian narratives following the announcement of the KFOR reduction are constructed through a clear interpretive chain. First, alarm is created, presenting the troop reduction as a “dangerous game”; then KFOR’s assessment is delegitimized, claiming that its reports do not match the reality on the ground; further, the Kosovo Police is delegitimized, presenting it as a source of threat; and finally, individual incidents are used as alleged evidence to support this framework.