

dovember 2023

**Monthly report on
information
disorder
October 2023**

**Action for
Democratic Society
hibrid.info**



Monthly report on information disorder October 2023

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Content

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Introduction

This summary and descriptive report, the first of its kind in Kosovo so far, offers an overview of the state of information (disinformation) throughout the month of July 2023, based on the data provided by the fact-checking platform – hibrid.info. This report is structured in a monitoring format and presents the situation over a one-month period, whereas, this is the 16th consecutive monthly report published so far.

This report is designed by the fact-checking platform hibrid.info, part of the Kosovar NGO "Action for Democratic Society" (ADS) and is supported by the American Foundation "National Endowment for Democracy" (NED) under the project "Promotion of Objective Journalism and Fighting Disinformation".

In this monitoring report is provided an overview of the form of media information on events in and around Kosovo. In the course of this report, several figures (graphics) deriving from the hibrid.info database is presented, divided under several rating categories that are part of the fact-checking methodology of this platform.

The report addresses 8 comparative categories of data, aiming to provide a more objective clarification of the state of information and to explain the trends of disinformation for this monitoring period.

The monitoring categories are:


- Rating of disinformation articles
- The topics used to create and disseminate disinformation content
- Areas upon which disinformation articles are created and disseminated
- Institutions and persons tackled by the disinformation articles
- Types of media that have created and disseminated disinformation content
- Categorization of media in Albanian and Serbian language that have created and disseminated misleading content
- Types of social media that have created and shared disinformation content
- Types of publishers in social media that have created and disseminated misleading content
- Checking and evaluation of statements

The content analyzed by the researchers of hibrid.info and that has served for the preparation of this report is primarily that published in Albanian and Serbian languages.

Evaluation categories of the disinformation

MAIN CATEGORIES


Here are the major categories listed according to the evaluated category



The data from October 2023 on the state of misinformation in Kosovo indicate changes in terms of trends in misleading content published by various media outlets and publishers. While in recent months the majority of misinformation articles were primarily clickbait and disinformation in some cases, during this month, unverified contents are on the top place at 29%, dominating all other categories. Unverified content is followed by disinformation at 21%, fake news at 18% and "clickbait" in fourth place at 17%. Despite the "clickbait" category being ranked first in recent months, it suffered a considerable decline in October. In the meantime, another noteworthy discovery pertains to misinformation rated as unverified content, that during the preceding month (September), marked an increase of 25%, ranking in the second position, however, over the course of the current month (October), it has ascended to the first position with a surge of 29%, resulting in the highest growth compared to the months of July-August 2023 when it appeared in percentages almost negligible (6% in July 2023 and 3% in August 2023).

Among the main reasons for these shifts in misinformation categories is the increase in the number of misleading content in the security domain, both in September and this month, elevating the percentage of unverified content. As a result, unverified content has prevailed due to the percentage of misinformation related to the Israel-Hamas conflict in the security domain, which have been rated as unverified content.

Consequently, this has led to a lower percentage of clickbait articles due to the significantly smaller number of misleading publications in the social and black chronicle domain during October 2023, which usually are rated as clickbait category.



29% of misinformation articles have been rated as "unverified content".

1.1 Analysis of rating types

01. Unverified Content

Misinformation rated under this category is primarily published by pages and accounts in the Albanian language operating on social media, specifically on Facebook. The majority of misinformation categorized as unverified content has been created and disseminated in the security domain related to the Israel-Hamas conflict. Within this context, images and video materials have been published by social media publishers, claiming to depict the situation of the Israel-Hamas conflict, and which, were qualified unverified content as they did not represent scenes from the conflict.

03. Fake news

All fake news has been published by pages and accounts in the Albanian language on social media. Almost all fake news has been published in the security and political domain. Fake news in the security domain regarded to fake images and video materials regarding the Israel-Hamas conflict, as well as false claims about the armament of the KSF with various weapons. Fake news in the political domain was related to false statements by the Belgian Prime Minister about Kurti, claiming he is extraordinary and deserves to be a leader in Europe, allegedly Dua Lipa reacted against Rita Ora after images with the Serbian tennis player Novak Djokovic and allegedly Edi Rama said that Vucic is more of a friend than Kurti.

05. Unverified Content/ Disinformation

All disinformation publications rated as "Unverified Content" are generated and disseminated within the domain of politics and security, which content specifically relates to the North and the supply of military armaments to the KSF. The majority of these unverified contents are propagated by publishers on social media, with a predominant focus on the Albanian language.

02. Disinformation

A considerable number of disinformation have been published by publishers creating and disseminating content in the Albanian language on social media. The majority of them were published in the security domain, while others were related to politics, social issues and sports. Disinformation under the security and political domain in the Albanian language on social media included fake images and video materials from the Israel-Hamas conflict. In Serbian language media, disinformation was published with the false claim that Hamas had bought weapons from the KLA.

04. Clickbait

Almost all content rated as "clickbait" has been published by mainstream media (news portals) in the Albanian language. A considerable portion of "clickbait" content has been created and published in the black chronicle and social domain. While "clickbait" articles from the black chronicle were related to tragic events (death, murder) without revealing the location in the headline title, those from the social domain were related to food products and job opportunities in Switzerland.


06. Hoax

Deceptive content has been published by pages and accounts on social media in the Albanian language. All deceptive content is from the social and political domain. Deceptive content within the social domain is related to deceptive claims about loan provision and circulation of deep fake videos portraying Elon Musk speaking in Albanian. Meanwhile, deceptive content within the political domain is associated with a deepfake video featuring Albin Kurti speaking Arabic and the manipulation of the image of Adem Jashari in a painting on the opening day of the Berlin Summit in Tirana.

The topics used to create and disseminate disinformation content

MAIN CATEGORIES

Here are the main categories listed according to the topics



Based on the monitoring of misleading content for the month of October, various publishers have disseminated misinformation about the Israel-Hamas conflict, constituting 49% of the total. As a result of the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas that commenced on the 7 October, social media saw a surge in unverified content claiming to provide information regarding the conflict. The increase in misleading publications on this topic is a consequence of the dynamic developments related to this event and the impact it had on certain social media accounts or pages, which also published various materials.

During October, content from the black chronicle, rated as "clickbait" and dealing with tragic themes such as murder, death and fatal accidents, ranks second at 6%. Despite being ranked second, this theme has experienced a decline in percentage compared to the previous month (September 16%), remaining one of the main topics in recent months (July, August and September 2023), aiming to boost clicks on articles in the black chronicle, insinuating that the event might have occurred in Albanian speaking areas (Kosovo, Albania or elsewhere).

During October, misleading content regarding the arming of the Kosovo Security Force (FSK) was published as a result of various speculations regarding purchase of armament by the state of Kosovo, even though it was officially announced that the "Bayraktar" drones were acquired from Turkey. This topic had dominated during June when the drone purchase was disclosed, while speculations about the purchase of other weapons occasionally circulate, primarily on social media.

In contrast to the previous month (September), when misleading content about the north dominated due to the terrorist attack in Banjskë, during this month (October) developments in the north have been calm, and therefore, this topic ranks fourth with 4%.

During this month, misleading content has been published regarding false claims about jobs in Switzerland, as well as unsaid statements attributed to Edi Rama regarding Albin Kurti and Ramush Haradinaj.



68% of the main topics revolve around the Israel-Hamas conflict, tragic incidents in various circumstances, the arming of the KSF, the north, jobs in Switzerland and Edi Rama's statements.

Fact-checking analysis according to topics

2.1

In the following are summarized analyses of four main topics (themes) addressed by various media and publishers, based on the measurements from the hibrid.info platform through fact-checking methodology.

01. Israel-Hamas Conflict

Almost all misleading content related to this topic has been published by pages and accounts on social media in the Albanian language. The majority of these contents have been published in the security domain, with a small portion from the political domain. Misinformation contents on this topic have been rated as unverified content and disinformation. Social media accounts and pages in Albanian, claiming to present the conflict situation, have shared old images and videos primarily from the Syrian war, earthquakes in Turkey, past protests and previous conflicts between Israel and Palestine. Additionally, AI generated images have been published by these pages and accounts, easily to be said, marking the first use of artificial intelligence to create images revolving around an international conflict. While, media in the Serbian language, has been spreading disinformation, alleging that Hamas bought weapons from KLA.

03. Arming of the KSF

All misleading contents regarding the arming of the KSF has been published by various pages and accounts on social media in the Albanian language. These contents are in the security domain, claiming that the KSF has been supplied with tanks, helicopters and airplanes, claims rated as "fake news."

02. Tragic Cases

Misinformation content related to various tragic incidents involving murder, death, fatal accidents and terrorism has been published by mainstream media (informative portals) in the Albanian language. All these contents have been published from the black chronicle domain and have been rated as "clickbait."

04. North


On this topic, misinformation content regarding the attack in Banjskë has continued to be published on social media in the Albanian language. All these misleading contents published by pages and accounts in social media are from the security domain and have been rated as unverified content and disinformation.

3

Types of domains

Based on the measurements conducted for October, various publishers (mainstream media, dubious portals and social media publishers) have predominantly created and disseminated misinformation in the domain of security. While in September, the security domain dominated due to misinformation about the terrorist attack in Banjskë, this month (October), it continues to rank first due to the publication of misleading content about the Israel-Hamas conflict. Parallel to this, in the security domain, misinformation about the terrorist attack in Banjskë has continued to be published throughout October as well, along with misleading content about the arming of KSF.

MAIN FIELDS
Here are the main fields listed



Although in September 2023, the security domain was ranked first with 33%, for the first time since December 2022, it has continued to dominate in October 2023, with a significant increase of 19% (52% in October). The Israel-Hamas conflict, started on 7 October, has influenced misinformation in the security domain and in particular on this topic, to be on the focus of various publishers, monitored by "hibrid.info", thus, this has resulted in just over half of the misinformation being in this domain. The security domain is followed by the political domain, which, with a slight increase compared to September, ranks second (21%). Despite this monitoring data, when these two domains are calculated together, 73% of all misleading articles published in July 2023 are dominated by political and security themes, indicating their prevalence at an extensive level.

With regard to misleading articles in the social domain, there has been no change in percentage compared to the previous month (September), but not also in terms of ranking. While the social domain ranked sixth in September with 9%, in October ranks third with the same percentage. Another characteristic of this month is the significant decrease of 18% in misleading publications in the black chronicle (from 27% as the second in September 2023 to 9% as the fourth in October 2023).

Almost all misleading contents in the security domain have been published by pages and accounts on social media (50%), with 2% published in mainstream media. In the security domain, 24% of misinformation is rated as unverified content, 12% as disinformation, 10% as fake news, 5% as unverified content/disinformation, and 1% as "clickbait." Almost all unverified contents and disinformation and a considerable portion of fake news, have been published about the Israel-Hamas conflict. The vast majority of them were published by publishers in the Albanian language, while in Serbian language mainstream media, disinformation was published alleging that Hamas bought weapons from the KLA.

With regard to misleading publications in the political domain, 15% were published on social media accounts and pages, while 6% were published in the media, under these categories of misinformation: fake news (7%), disinformation (5%), clickbait (4%), hoax (2%), conspiracy theories (1%) and unverified content (1%). Fake news were published by social media publishers about the Israel-Hamas conflict and Edi Rama's unsaid statements related to Albin Kurti and Ramush Haradinaj. Meanwhile, disinformation has been published on social media in the Albanian language about the Israel-Hamas conflict. Deceptive contents, including a deepfake video of Prime Minister Kurti speaking in Arabic and the manipulated image of Adem Jashari in a painting on the opening day of the Berlin Summit in Tirana, were published as misleading content in the social domain. Misleading contents in the social domain were mostly rated as "clickbait" (4%), hoax (2%), disinformation/clickbait (1%) and disinformation (1%). "Clickbait" contents were published by mainstream media and social media about the prices of food products and job vacancies in Switzerland. Misleading articles from the black chronicle domain were rated as "clickbait" (7%) published by mainstream media and unverified content (1%) published by social media publishers, covering tragic events, earthquakes and floods.



94% of misinformation content are related to security, politics, social issues, black chronicle and sport.


4

Types of publishers

Unlike the preceding two months (August-September) when the majority of misleading articles were published by mainstream media, in October, pages and profiles on social media were the primary sources of misinformation. Not only has misinformation dominated on social media, but there's also a considerable increase compared to the previous month (from 39% in September 2023 to 73% in October 2023). This is a result of the fact that the majority of unverified, disinformation, and fake news content has been published by publishers on social media.

Monitoring data indicate that 73% of misleading content has been disseminated by pages and accounts on social media, followed by 27% from mainstream media. Comparing it to the previous month, it surfaces that misleading content published on social media has marked an increase of 34%, while misinformation in the media has decreased by 32% (from 59% in September 2023 to 27% in October 2023). During the monitoring in October, based on the hibrid.info search sample, no misinformation published by dubious portals has been encountered.

DIFFERENCE IN PERCENTAGE
BETWEEN PUBLISHERS WITH
DISINFORMATION CONTENT




73% of articles with misinformation content have been published by social media.

5

Classification of publications in the Albanian and Serbian language

This measurement reveals the language in which the scrutinized disinformation articles have been published over the course of one month, categorizing the media into Albanian, Serbian and other languages concerning their coverage reports of the developments in and around Kosovo.

PERCENTAGE OF MEDIA PUBLICATIONS IN ALBANIAN AND SERBIAN LANGUAGES



During this month as well, various publishers in the Albanian language have published the majority of misleading content, accounting for 96%. This is understandable given that the monitoring sample from the "hibrid.info" platform focuses more on content published in the Albanian language by mainstream media, social media publishers and dubious portals, while in the Serbian language, only misinformation reports from Serbian mainstream media related to developments in and around Kosovo are mainly monitored.

Based on the monitoring data, 73% of content in the Albanian language has been published by pages and accounts on social media, while 23% in mainstream media. Meanwhile, all misinformation in the Serbian language has been published in mainstream media (4%).

Analysis of articles in this category

5.1

In this section of the report, disinformation publications published by media outlets in Albanian, Serbian and other languages are analyzed. The following narrative provides an overview of their interrelations across categorizations, domains, and addressed topics.

01. Publications in Albanian language

Various publishers on social media in the Albanian language have predominantly published misinformation content for October 2023, followed by mainstream media. While in previous months, misinformation content categorized as "clickbait" dominated, in October, unverified content ranks first with 29%, as a significant percentage of misinformation from the security domain is rated as unverified content. It is followed by disinformation at 20%, fake news at 18%, and "clickbait" at 17%. Just over half of the misinformation in the Albanian language has been created and disseminated in the security domain (51%), followed by politics (20%) and the black chronicle (9%).

02. Publications in Serbian language

All misinformation content in the Serbian language has been published by mainstream media in the domain of security, politics and sports. These misleading publications in Serbian are classified as conspiracy theories, disinformation and disinformation/unverified content. In the media in Serbian language, a conspiracy theory was published claiming that Albanian spies would buy votes against President Aleksandar Vučić in the Serbian elections, disinformation that Hamas has bought weapons from the KLA and disinformation/unverified content about manipulated statements by footballer Altin Zeqiri.


6

Types of social media

In this section, only disinformation articles published and disseminated on social media are analyzed, excluding publications in other media outlets (mainstream media and dubious portals).

In the course of monitoring throughout October 2023, the prevalence of misleading content on Facebook has been notably significant, comprising 88% of the total. Consistent with trends observed in earlier months, the dominance of misinformation on Facebook persists in comparison to TikTok, which secures the second position with 12%, having a decline compared to the preceding months. Thus, 88% of misinformation content was published and disseminated on Facebook, followed by TikTok with 12%.

PERCENTAGE OF
PUBLICATIONS ON SOCIAL
MEDIA




6.1

Types of publishers in social media

This measurement analyzes, through monitoring data, the interaction on social media regarding the publication and dissemination of disinformation articles by various publishers on social media platforms. This is done through these main categories of publishers: accounts, pages, profiles, media and channels managed by social media users.

In the month of October, various pages in Albanian language on Facebook published the most of the misleading and diverse content, while the rest was published by accounts 8% and media 8%. Even during October 2023, Facebook pages have dominated in terms of the dissemination of misleading articles, followed by TikTok accounts (12%).

PERCENTAGE OF TYPES OF PUBLISHERS IN SOCIAL MEDIA



Analysis of Types of Publishers on Social Media

The following categories of social media are analyzed in relation to the publication and dissemination of disinformation content.

01. Facebook


More than half of the misinformation published by pages, accounts and media outlets on Facebook is related to the security domain (65%), followed by politics (13%), social issues (7%), black chronicle (2%) and health (2%). Unverified content (35%), disinformation (23%) and fake news (18%) are the categories that constitute the majority of misinformation published on Facebook. In terms of topics, misinformation about the Israel-Hamas conflict dominates with 62%, followed by the arming of the KSF (7%) and the north (5%).

02. TikTok

The overwhelming majority of misinformation publications in TikTok accounts are related to political and security topics, as well as a misinformation in the social domain. These contents published by accounts in TikTok were rated as fake news and hoax. Fake news were made claiming that Serbia will attack Kosovo, an unsaid statement by Edi Rama that President Vučić is more of a friend than Prime Minister Kurti and the Belgian Prime Minister supposedly said about Kurti that "he deserves to be the leader of Europe." On TikTok have been published deceptive content, deepfake videos of Prime Minister Albin Kurti speaking Arabic and that of Elon Musk speaking Albanian, as well as manipulated images of Adem Jashari on a painting on the opening day of the Berlin Summit in Tirana.

Most outspoken personalities and institutions

This measurement analyzes data to determine which institutions and personalities (political public figures) have been most outspoken through the monitoring of articles with disinformation content.




Based on the monitoring for October 2023, in the misinformation content published upon and about developments in Kosovo, security institutions were the ones mentioned and discussed in these misinformation contents. Among them, the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) is the institution most prominently mentioned and implicated in the misinformation created and disseminated by various publishers. KSF was mentioned in misleading content published on social media (Facebook) with claims that KSF would be equipped with tanks, that Turkey to KSF had donated airplanes, helicopters and 6 "Bayraktar" drones.

The Kosovo Police is the second most mentioned institution in misinformation content in the context with other institutions. This security institution was mentioned in misleading contents related to the terrorist attack in Banjskë, contents that continued to be published throughout October on social media. Additionally, the Kosovo Police became involved with the Police Union regarding the payment of police officers engaged in the north recently.

The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was mentioned in misleading content published in the media in Serbian language, with the disinformation claim that the armed group of Hamas purchased weapons from the KLA.

RANKING OF MOST OUTSPOKEN INDIVIDUALS BY PERCENTAGE



Based on the monitoring data for October 2023, the President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić and the Prime Minister, Edi Rama, are the two most mentioned figures in the context with other personalities. Vučić was mentioned in two “clickbait” articles in media in Albanian language, claiming that Germany says that “Vučić cannot be trusted” and also that “Aleksandar Vučić alongside Radojčić on the American blacklist.” He was also mentioned in the false claim that Edi Rama declared Vučić is a closer friend than Kurti. Rama was mentioned for allegedly feeling disgust towards Haradinaj for toasting glasses with the representatives of the Serb List, as well as for the false content claiming that Rifat Jashari reacted to Edi Rama, saying, “hugs and kisses with Vučić you will pay dearly from Kosovo.”

As the second most mentioned figure in misleading content during this month is the Prime Minister of Kosovo, Albin Kurti. A deepfake video was published on TikTok where Kurti appears to be speaking Arabic and false content on TikTok claimed that the Belgian Prime Minister supposedly declared, “Albin Kurti is extraordinary” and “he deserves to be the leader of Europe.”

Other mentioned personalities are Adem Jashari, Minister Rozeta Hajdari, football player Andi Zeqiri and Cristiano Ronaldo, etc.



Checking and evaluation of statements

Hibrid.info, in addition to monitoring and analyzing media articles, also conducts checking and evaluations of statements made by high-ranking political and institutional officials, as well as those figures with public influence. The evaluation of these figures, according to the methodology of hibrid.info, is carried out under the categories of truthfulness, sustainability and holding of promises.

RANKING OF CHECKING AND EVALUATION OF STATEMENTS



Within the content monitored during the month of October, hibrid.info checked and analyzed two statements of promises.

Prime Minister Albin Kurti in 2021, during a visit to the Publicly-Owned Enterprise "Trepça" in the local elections, had promised investments of 70 million euros in two years (2022 and 2023) for this institution. Based on verifications and fact-checking, it has been confirmed that the amount allocated for the enterprise in question during these two years reaches 20 million euros, meaning that Prime Minister Kurti's promise was not kept.

In the "Debat Plus" show on Dukagjini television, date 27 September, the issue of non-execution of risk supplements for the Kosovo Police was raised. Enver Dugolli, a Member of Parliament of the Kosovo Assembly from the ranks of the Lëvizja Vetëvendosje (Self-Determination Movement), expressed in this show that there is no agreement between the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Internal Affairs on how to address this problem and that this issue will be resolved in two to three days. Based on the fact that the problem was not resolved within the time announced by MP Dugolli, this statement has been evaluated as an unkept promise.

Methodology

For the preparation of this monitoring report, both quantitative and qualitative methods were used.

With regard to quantitative methods, a database was initially created from ADS/hibrid.info in order to break down and analyze in details the misinformation trends. Through this database, regularly maintained and updated daily by the ADS/hibrid.info staff, articles with disinformation content are monitored.

This means that all articles published on the hibrid.info platform are placed in the database, and the latter serves as the main source for preparing the monitoring report. Furthermore, the methodology used to analyze the presented data in the monitoring report enables data filtering into daily, weekly, and monthly basis, mainly in quantitative form, to better understand the phenomenon of disinformation of those analyzed articles for this one month period of time according to various categories and ratings.

Parallel to this, another important source for this report is the ADS/hibrid.info methodology (published on the hibrid.info website) for combating informational disorder. This methodology, which is first and foremost based on qualitative methods, has been developed by the professional staff of ADS/hibrid.info and is in line with the highest international standards for fact-checking, following the guidelines of the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN), respectively. ADS/hibrid.info is a full member of this international mechanism - IFCN.

This monitoring report covers the period from 1 July to 31 July 2023.

Conclusions

This short monitoring report provides a snapshot of the one month state of play of information (misinformation) during October 2023, from the data from the fact-checking platform – hibrid.info.

Based on the monitoring in the course of October 2023, various publishers created and disseminated mostly unverified content at 29%, followed by disinformation at 21%, fake news at 18% and "clickbait" at 17% in fourth position. The overwhelming majority of misinformation, rated as unverified content, was created and disseminated in the security domain, in regard to the Israel-Hamas conflict and were published by accounts and pages in Albanian language on Facebook. Also a considerable number of disinformation were also published on social media from the security and political domains, mainly on the Israel-Hamas conflict. Fake news was disseminated on social media by publishers in Albanian language, including false images and video materials related to the Israel-Hamas conflict and false claims about the arming of the KSF with various weaponry. Meanwhile, nearly all rated content as "clickbait" was published by mainstream media (news portals) in Albanian language, with a considerable portion created and published in the black chronicle and social domains.

The primary focus of various publishers during October 2023 revolved around the Israel-Hamas conflict. As a result of the conflict developments started on 7 October, a substantial volume of unverified content claiming to present information about the conflict was published on social media. The vast majority of these contents were published in the security domain, while a small portion in the political domain and both being rated as unverified content and disinformation. Misleading contents from the black chronicle, linked to loss of life, murders, disasters and earthquakes coded as "tragic cases," published by news portals in Albanian language, ranked second in the topics with 6%.

Security and politics are two domains intertwined one to another, constituting more than half of the misinformation content (73%) for the month of October. Most content from the security domain was rated as unverified and disinformation, published by pages on social media in Albanian language. Meanwhile, in the political sphere, disinformation and fake news were published on social media in Albanian language and in the mainstream media in Serbian language. Other misinformation domain include social issues (9%) and the black chronicle (9%).

Based on monitoring data for October 2023, misinformation publications on social media lead with 73%, followed by mainstream media with 23%. During this month, 96% of misinformation content was published by media and pages on social media (Facebook) in Albanian language, while 4% was in media in Serbian language. While half of the misinformation content published in Albanian language is related to security and politics domains, all of the content in Serbian language is related to politics, security, and sports. Publishers in the Albanian language during October 2023 mostly published unverified content at 29%, with disinformation in second place at 20%, followed by fake news at 17%. Meanwhile, misinformation content in the Serbian language was rated as disinformation (1%), disinformation/unverified content (1%) and conspiracy theories (1%). Regarding publications by publishers on social media, 88% were published on Facebook, followed by TikTok with 12%.

Aleksandar Vučić and Prime Minister Edi Rama are the two most mentioned figures in context with other personalities under the misinformation published by publishers in Albanian and Serbian languages. Regarding institutions, security institutions (KSF, Kosovo Police) are included and mentioned in disinformation content, with the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) having the lead.

Prime Minister Albin Kurti did not keep the promise made in 2021 during a visit to the Publicly Owned Enterprise "Trepča," where he promised investments of 70 million euros in two years (2022 and 2023) for this institution. The unkept promise by Kosovo Assembly Deputy from the Lëvizja Vetëvendosje (Self-Determination Movement), Enver Dugolli, invited to the "Debat Plus" show on Dukagjini television, where he expressed that the issue of non-execution of risk supplements for the Kosovo Police would be resolved in two to three days.

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