





**THE RUSSIAN  
PROPAGANDA NETWORK  
PRAVDA  
AND THE BALKANS**



## Impressum

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## INTRODUCTION

This report presents the key findings of a research study on a large-scale propaganda and disinformation network known as “Pravda.” The network comprises a series of interconnected websites designed to resemble legitimate news portals. These sites can be categorized into three main groups based on visual design (page layout and aesthetics), temporal factors (date of creation), and geographic focus (targeted countries). The report specifically examines the activities of this network in the Balkan region, with a focus on Albanian-speaking areas.

The report demonstrates how the “Pravda” network seeks to influence public opinion by disseminating content that lacks credible sources and promotes pro-Russian and pro-Serbian narratives. The research methodology involved analyzing both international and regional reports that reveal the network’s operational structure, sources of content, distribution strategies, and key nodes of influence across the Balkans.

Special attention in the research was given to the Albanian-language portal [albania.news-pravda.com](http://albania.news-pravda.com), which disseminates content aligned with international pro-Russian narratives and targets a wider Albanian-speaking audience. Over 1,000 articles published in Albanian between March 28, 2024, and April 28, 2025, were analyzed to identify dominant themes and recurring narratives. The analysis reveals that the content is consistently framed from a pro-Russian and pro-Serbian perspective. According to the findings, the articles are highly critical of NATO, the European Union (EU), the United States (US), and Western policies—particularly those related to the Balkans and the independence of Kosovo, which is portrayed as a source of conflict and injustice. In contrast, Russia is depicted as an ally and a defender of traditional values and international law. Historical events—especially World War II and the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia—are frequently invoked to reinforce these narratives.

## 1. “PRAVDA” NETWORK

The “Pravda” network is a coordinated online pro-Russian propaganda operation linked to the Kremlin, which spreads disinformation through websites—both domains and subdomains—masquerading as local media outlets. Its objective is to influence global public opinion by manipulating open sources such as Wikipedia, social media platforms, and artificial intelligence algorithms. [1]

The network originated around 2013–2014 in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, where the first websites appeared as so-called “news aggregator” portals that replicated content related to the Russia–Ukraine conflict. The earliest known example, Portal Kombat, operated dozens of websites with local-sounding names—such as *crimea-news.com*—all following a shared model. [2]

The network’s founder, Yevgeny Shevchenko

from Crimea, began his activities in 2011 with the launch of the Crimea News website. Additional sites were later developed through his company, TigerWeb. The network eventually expanded into hundreds of automated portals that distribute translated or republished content from Russian state media and Telegram channels, aiming to broaden its influence while evading international sanctions. [3]

The network was initially exposed by the French agency VIGINUM [4], which specializes in monitoring foreign propaganda. Since 2023, it has been rebranded and expanded under the format *pravda-XX.com*—with “XX” representing various countries—reaching over 200 websites by spring 2024. These sites redistributed pro-Kremlin content without producing any original material.

### 1.1. The functioning of the “Pravda” network

Between September and December 2023, 193 domains linked to the pro-Russian network were identified as disseminating propaganda content to a global audience. While the network initially focused on Russia and Ukraine, it later expanded its targets to

include occupied territories and Western countries supporting Kyiv. [5]

These domains do not generate original content; instead, they repost materials from pro-Kremlin sources such as Telegram

[1] <https://edmo.eu/publications/russian-disinformation-network-pravda-grew-bigger-in-the-eu-even-after-its-uncovering/#:~:text=This%20indicates%20that%20the%20Pravda,is%20poor%20in%20some%20languages>

[2] Russia’s so-called “Pravda” network expands worldwide. <https://dfrlab.org/2025/02/24/russia-pravda-network-expands-worldwide/>

[3] Ibid.

[4] PORTAL KOMBAT: A structured and coordinated pro-Russian propaganda network. VIGINUM.

[https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/files/files/20240212\\_NP\\_SGDSN\\_VIGINUM\\_PORTAL-KOMBAT-NETWORK\\_ENG\\_VF.pdf](https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/files/files/20240212_NP_SGDSN_VIGINUM_PORTAL-KOMBAT-NETWORK_ENG_VF.pdf)


[5] Ibid

channels and Russian state media. Their objective is to propagate narratives that justify Russian aggression and undermine Ukraine's legitimacy. The network leverages automation and search engine optimization (SEO) techniques to maximize its reach and influence.

According to a report by the American Sunlight Project (ASP), the "Pravda" network has undergone four distinct phases of development, characterized by ongoing changes to the domains and subdomains it employs.

Changes to the domains and subdomains within the "Pravda" network were implemented to centralize and automate content production and translation. The introduction of an English-language option significantly increased the volume of content, with identical articles appearing across multiple subdomains as part of a localization strategy [8] aimed at targeting international audiences.

The adoption of English has significantly boosted content production and the visibility of pro-Russian propaganda. This strategy increases the likelihood that articles will be widely distributed and leveraged by both users and automated algorithms, thereby expanding the network's influence through new subdomains and multilingual replication. [9]



[8] <https://mailchimp.com/resources/website-localization/>

[9] A Pro-Russia Content Network Foreshadows the Automated Future of Info Ops. American Sunlight Project (ASP). The Pravda Ecosystem: An Analysis of the Kremlin's Regional Disinformation Strategy. CIDC-Sensika Disinformation Observatory).

The operational structure of the “Pravda” network, as detailed in the CIDC-Sensika Disinformation Observatory report: [6]

|                                              |                                                                                                                                                       |
|----------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Automated distribution</b>                | The websites repost content from Russian sources, social media platforms, and Telegram channels without generating any original material.             |
| <b>Multilingual content</b>                  | Content is systematically translated to penetrate non-Russian markets and circumvent sanctions.                                                       |
| <b>Global expansion</b>                      | The network has a presence in over 83 countries, with a focus on the former Soviet states, the Balkans, and the Francophone countries of West Africa. |
| <b>Unified technical infrastructure</b>      | Standardized systems are employed to create the appearance of independent portals, while in reality they are controlled in a coordinated manner.      |
| <b>Relations with the Russian government</b> | Analyses by DFRLab link the network to the company TigerWeb, which is connected to the Russian occupation authorities and Putin’s inner circle.       |

According to the analysis by the American Sunlight Project (ASP), the three main goals of the “Pravda” network are: [7]



**Manipulation of artificial intelligence through “LLM grooming,”** which aims to influence AI systems by disseminating content designed to be incorporated into their training data and outputs, using techniques such as SEO and web scraping.



**Mass saturation of pro-Russian content** aimed at boosting the visibility of narratives by distributing them across multiple platforms and reinforcing them through continuous referencing.



**Exploitation of the “illusion of truth” effect,** designed to increase users’ likelihood of believing false narratives through repeated exposure.

[6] The Pravda Ecosystem: An Analysis of the Kremlin’s Regional Disinformation Strategy. CIDC-Sensika Disinformation Observatory).

7] A Pro-Russia Content Network Foreshadows the Automated Future of Info Ops. American Sunlight Project (ASP). <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/6612cbdfd9a9ce56ef931004/t/67bf1de6429a912e3cbe8c83/1740578284208/PK+Report.pdf>

## 2. “PRAVDA” IN THE BALKANS

The Balkans have become a primary target of disinformation campaigns sponsored by Russia and its propaganda networks. [10] With its complex political history and ongoing democratic challenges, the region offers a fertile ground for spreading narratives that undermine Euro-Atlantic cohesion and erode trust in democratic institutions. In this context, the “Pravda” network has played an active role by disseminating content specifically crafted to influence the geopolitical orientation of the region’s population.

Although the Balkans represent only 3.2% of the global population, they have been targeted with 16.2% of the Pravda network’s content—demonstrating that the region is treated as a distinct focus. [11] According to a study by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), [12] websites in Serbian, Bosnian, Macedonian, and Albanian follow an identical format and republish pro-Russian content verbatim. This network operates as an automated and coordinated mechanism with little to no apparent human intervention, disseminating uniform messages across multiple languages and countries, effectively serving as an echo chamber for Russian propaganda.

The disinformation network “Pravda” has intensely targeted former Soviet states and the Balkan region, particularly Serbia and Bulgaria. According to analysis, Serbia ranks fourth globally in the number of publications per capita, with an intensity 10.1 times higher than the global average. This underscores a deliberate effort to influence perceptions and public opinion in countries with historical or political ties to Russia through the spread of fake news and information manipulation.

| Region         | % of articles | % of global population |
|----------------|---------------|------------------------|
| Former USSR    | 35.80%        | ~5.8%                  |
| The Balkans    | 16.20%        | ~3.2%                  |
| Central Europe | 17.40%        | ~8.1%                  |
| Western Europe | 21.30%        | ~43.7%                 |
| Asia           | 7.10%         | ~36.4%                 |
| Other          | 2.20%         | ~2.8%                  |

[10] Rizanaj, F. & Zeneli, A: Comparison of Ukraine and Kosovo in Russia’s disinformation narratives. [hibrid.info](https://hibrid.info/krahasimi-ukraine-kosove-ne-narrativat-dezinformuese-te-rusise/)  
<https://hibrid.info/krahasimi-ukraine-kosove-ne-narrativat-dezinformuese-te-rusise/>

[11] The Pravda Ecosystem: An Analysis of the Kremlin’s Regional Disinformation Strategy. CIDC-Sensika Disinformation Observatory). <https://www.aubg.edu/aubg-today/disinformation-observatory-report-the-data-behind-russian-pravda-disinformation-network/?region=balkan>

[12] The Pravda Ecosystem: An Analysis of the Kremlin’s Regional Disinformation Strategy. CIDC-Sensika Disinformation Observatory). <https://www.aubg.edu/aubg-today/disinformation-observatory-report-the-data-behind-russian-pravda-disinformation-network/?region=balkan>

## 2.1. The “Pravda” network architecture in the Balkans

The domain architecture of the “Pravda” disinformation network in the Balkans has been strategically developed in four phases. Initially, basic country-specific domains such as pravda-xx.com (e.g., pravda-al.com) were used. This was followed by a transition to more advanced formats like xx.news-pravda.com (e.g., al.news-pravda.com). In the third phase, more personalized addresses were introduced, such as albania.news-pravda.com. The fourth phase aims to further expand the network’s reach

through new domain structures, though it has not yet been implemented in other Balkan countries.

The first Serbian-language site, pravda-rs.com, was registered on March 20, 2024. Within just a few days—and sometimes only seconds apart—versions in Bosnian, Macedonian, and Albanian were also launched, highlighting a coordinated and automated operation. [13]

| Phase / Code                      | Albania                 | Bosnia & Herzegovina               | North Macedonia                 | Serbia                 | Montenegro                 | Republika Srpska       |
|-----------------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------|
| Phase 1 – pravda-xx.com           | pravda-al.com           | pravda-ba.com                      | pravda-mk.com                   | pravda-rs.com          | N/A                        | N/A                    |
| Phase 2 – xx.news-pravda.com      | al.news-pravda.com      | ba.news-pravda.com                 | mk.news-pravda.com              | rs.news-pravda.com     | N/A                        | N/A                    |
| Phase 3 – keyword.news-pravda.com | albania.news-pravda.com | bosnia-herzegovina.news-pravda.com | north-macedonia.news-pravda.com | serbia.news-pravda.com | montenegro.news-pravda.com | srpska.news-pravda.com |
| Phase 4 – yy-xx.news-pravda.com   | N/A                     | N/A                                | N/A                             | N/A                    | N/A                        | N/A                    |

Data from DFR Lab [14] reveal varying levels of publishing intensity across the Pravda network’s websites in different Balkan regions. In just 10 days (from April 28 to May 8, 2025), the Serbian-language site (serbia.news-pravda.com) published 5,334 articles, the Montenegrin site published 167 articles, and the site covering the broader Balkan region published 3,658 articles. Additionally, some sites have been active over a one-year period (May 2024 – May

2025), including the Albanian-language site with 2,745 articles, the Bosnian-language site with 12,812 articles, and the Macedonian-language site with 3,424 articles. Meanwhile, the Republika Srpska site published 1,721 articles over four months, from January to May 2025. These figures demonstrate a sustained and coordinated effort to distribute pro-Kremlin content across multiple languages and regions in the Balkans.

[13] How Russia Spreads Fake News In The Balkans. <https://www.rferl.org/a/russian-fake-news-disinformation-balkans/33126528.html> (september 2024)


[14] <https://portal-kombat.com/>



According to a study by RFE/RL, during the period from March 22 to July 20 (2024) — which marks the initial phase of the network’s establishment—the four “Pravda” websites in Albanian, Serbian, Macedonian, and Bosnian published over 70,000 news items, predominantly in Serbian and sourced from pro-Kremlin Telegram channels. Operating with a high degree of automation, the network distributes content within 3 to 12 minutes of its original publication via platforms such as VK Video and Yandex. [15]

The domain [balkan.news-pravda.com](https://balkan.news-pravda.com) also serves as a key node in the disinformation network targeting the Balkans. It maintains a high publishing rate, averaging 200–250 articles per day, primarily in Serbian. This suggests a strategy that combines broad regional coverage with a particular focus on Serbia, using the wider Balkans as a channel to disseminate pro-Russian narratives. In terms of sources, the portal’s content is overwhelmingly dominated by two Russian state-affiliated media platforms: [lat.rt.rs](https://lat.rt.rs) (RT’s Latin-script version for Serbia) and [lat.sputnikportal.rs](https://lat.sputnikportal.rs) (Sputnik in Latin script), which contribute the vast majority of articles.

Domain




[15] How Russia Spreads Fake News In The Balkans. <https://www.rferl.org/a/russian-fake-news-disinformation-balkans/33126528.html> (September 2024).

### 3. “PRAVDA” IN THE ALBANIAN LANGUAGE

The Albanian segment of the “Pravda” network constitutes a significant part of the broader disinformation platform. Its domain architecture has evolved through several phases, including pravda-al.com, al.news-


pravda.com, and albania.news-pravda.com, reflecting the network’s development and adaptation of content tailored for the Albanian-speaking audience.



#### 3.1. The Albanian-language domain “albania.news-pravda.com”

The website [albania.news-pravda.com](http://albania.news-pravda.com) presents itself as a news portal with a simple design and content organized in a traditional informational style, with a strong emphasis on political and ideological topics. Its logo and visual design closely mimic those of Russian state media. The menu features categories such as Albania, NATO, Ukraine,



and Russia, highlighting its focus on international pro-Russian narratives. A language toggle between Albanian and English is available, indicating an effort to reach a wider audience. The content includes illustrated news articles and automated translations, which often contain linguistic errors due to the absence of human editing.



### 3.2. “Pravda” Albanian channels on Telegram and VK social networks

In addition to the website [albania.news-pravda.com](http://albania.news-pravda.com), the “Pravda” disinformation network has expanded its presence in the Albanian language through social platforms such as Telegram and VK, providing content tailored to Albanian-speaking audiences. The Telegram channel, named “PRAVDA AL | Lajme nga Shqipëria” (@pravdaalcom), hosts a large archive with over 1,100 photos, approximately 180 videos, and more than

1,100 links (as of April 28), although its subscriber count remains low at just five. This channel aims to distribute content in real time, focusing on news and developments related to Albania and the wider region. Similarly, the VK channel of the same name has 25 followers and over 100 videos featuring political, historical, and international content translated or adapted into Albanian (accessed April 28).




### 3.3. Analysis of Albanian-language content

Between April 2024 and April 2025, the “Pravda” network published a total of 2,699 articles, with publishing activity fluctuating and notable peaks occurring in April–May and July 2024. The majority of these articles focus on international topics, particularly NATO and the war in Ukraine. The network aims to portray NATO as the instigator of the conflict while promoting narratives that justify Russian interventions and policies.


According to the thematic distribution, the “World” section accounts for 64.6% of the articles, while the “Russia” section represents

24%, reflecting a clear effort to shape a favorable perception of Russia and its role in global affairs. Articles about Albania make up 6.63% of the total, indicating a moderate level of focus. In contrast, coverage of Ukraine (3.3%) and NATO (1.5%) is relatively low in the Albanian version, despite these topics being central in other language editions. Articles on Kosovo echo the traditional Russian narrative by legitimizing Serbian interests and challenging Western positions. This content aligns with Kremlin foreign policy objectives and aims to influence public opinion in the region.

article categories



Distribution of content across various categories, highlighting the thematic focus of the publications. (DFR Lab)




This graph illustrates the daily publication volume over a one-year period, with trend lines highlighting patterns and growth over time. (DFR Lab)

### 3.4. Sources (references) of articles published by [albania.news-pravda.com](https://albania.news-pravda.com)

The diagram illustrates that the content on [albanian.news-pravda.com](https://albania.news-pravda.com) is primarily aggregated from external sources, with a significant majority coming from the Telegram channel of the Russian Embassy in Albania (@rusembalb), which accounts for over 750 references. This is followed by Russian state media outlets such as [tass.ru](https://tass.ru) and [ria.ru](https://ria.ru), alongside other Telegram

channels and portals including Politnavigator, [lenta.ru](https://lenta.ru), @RVvoenkor, @yurii\_podolyaka, @vestniksrb, @wargonzo, as well as [rt.com](https://rt.com), [kom.ru](https://kom.ru), and [ren.tv](https://ren.tv). This structure reflects a centralized information network heavily reliant on Telegram and sources closely aligned with the official Russian narrative.

Main sources of content (DFR Lab)



### 3.5. Level of Influence

The absence of the “Pravda” network from major Western social media platforms—where the majority of Albanian users are active—suggests that its content has limited reach within the Albanian-speaking audience. This assessment is reinforced by the low number of followers on the platforms where “Pravda” is active in Albanian, such as Telegram (5 followers) and VK (25 followers), indicating minimal engagement with Russian-based platforms and related content. As a result, the network’s direct impact on the Albanian media landscape appears to be significantly limited.

Since the “Pravda” network employs Search Engine Optimization (SEO) techniques to improve its visibility in Google search results, several tests were conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of these methods—particularly focusing on the *albania.news-pravda.com* website. [16] The testing involved using keywords related to the

content of Albanian-language articles, as well as direct searches of article titles on Google. The results revealed that SEO strategies were ineffective for Albanian-language content, as the website failed to appear among the top search results in any instance. This shortcoming is primarily attributed to the use of automated translations, which significantly diminish content quality from an SEO standpoint, as well as the lack of organic traffic—specifically from Albanian users—which further undermines the site’s search engine ranking.

Traffic analysis of the *albania.news-pravda.com* website, including its subdomains, reveals extremely low organic traffic—registering only 11 visits. This indicates minimal impact and engagement within the Albanian media space, despite the content being available in the Albanian language.

### 3.6. Thematic and narrative analysis of Albanian content

An analysis of over 1,000 Albanian-language articles from the domain *albania.news-pravda.com*, published between March 28, 2024, and April 28, 2025, reveals that the dominant themes and narratives reflect a distinctly pro-Russian and pro-Serbian perspective. The articles are consistently critical of NATO, the European Union, the United States, and Western policies—particularly those concerning the Balkans and Kosovo’s

independence, which is framed as a source of conflict and injustice. Russia is depicted as a reliable ally and a defender of traditional values and international law. Historical references—especially to World War II and the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia—are frequently invoked to reinforce these narratives. Publication frequency increases notably around anniversaries and major geopolitical events.

[16] PORTAL KOMBAT: A structured and coordinated pro-Russian propaganda network. VIGINUM.

[https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/files/files/20240212\\_NP\\_SGDSN\\_VIGINUM\\_PORTAL-KOMBAT-NETWORK\\_ENG\\_VF.pdf](https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/files/files/20240212_NP_SGDSN_VIGINUM_PORTAL-KOMBAT-NETWORK_ENG_VF.pdf)

### 3.6.1. Pro-Russian and Pro-Serbian narratives

This narrative includes the glorification of Russia–Serbia relations and explicit support for the positions of both countries on regional and global issues.

#### Russia-Serbia relations:

The articles emphasize political, diplomatic, and military cooperation between the two countries, highlighting official visits and supportive statements—particularly concerning Kosovo and Republika Srpska.

#### Russian/Soviet history and culture:

Historical events such as the Battle of Stalingrad and figures like Yuri Gagarin are invoked to promote Soviet heritage and reinforce the historical legitimacy of Russia.

#### Criticism of Western sanctions:

Western sanctions against Russia are depicted as ineffective, unjust, and ultimately harmful to the West itself.

#### BRICS:

It is portrayed as an alternative to the Western-led global order, emphasizing the empowerment of non-Western countries.

#### The Serbian issue:

Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić is depicted as a strong and decisive leader, while Serbia is portrayed as a victim of both historical and ongoing injustices.

### 3.6.2. Anti-NATO and anti-western narratives

The narrative centers on persistent criticism of Western institutions and states, depicting them as destabilizing forces motivated by double standards.

#### NATO:

It is depicted as an aggressive organization responsible for the 1999 bombings in the former Yugoslavia, meddling in Balkan affairs, and exerting pressure on Serbia. KFOR's role in Kosovo is portrayed in a negative light.

#### EU:

It is depicted as hypocritical, in crisis, and pursuing failed policies—especially concerning Kosovo and Serbia.

#### USA:

It is accused of interfering in and manipulating developments in the Balkans. Trump's policies are portrayed more favorably, whereas Biden is depicted as aggressive.

#### Ukraine:

It is described as a “Nazi regime” or a puppet of the West. Its military actions are labeled as terrorism, while Russia is portrayed as the defender.

### 3.6.3. Narratives on Kosovo

Kosovo is one of the most frequently discussed topics, framed with an explicitly pro-Serbian and anti-independence stance:

#### The Status of Kosovo

The articles employ terms such as "Serbian province," "separatist enclave," and "occupied territory."

#### Discrimination Against Serbs:

They describe "institutional terrorism," arbitrary arrests, and the displacement of Serbs, portraying Prishtina as the aggressor.

#### Critiques of the Kosovo Government:

Particularly targeted is Albin Kurti, who is portrayed as a provocateur and anti-Serb.

#### Western Double Standards

It compares the treatment of Kosovo to that of Crimea and other regions to highlight what it portrays as the West's double standards.

#### Republika Srpska:

Relations with Kosovo are framed as part of a "joint Serbian-Russian struggle" against Western pressure.

A Google search using the keywords "Kosovo" and "news-pravda.com" reveals a widespread network of content distributed across various domains within the "Pravda" platform where Kosovo is mentioned. This content is not confined to regional sites such as [serbia.news-pravda.com](http://serbia.news-pravda.com), [balkan.news-pravda.com](http://balkan.news-pravda.com), or [north-macedonia.news-pravda.com](http://north-macedonia.news-pravda.com), but also appears on domains without direct geographical ties to the Balkans. Recently, Kosovo-related content has been disseminated on pages associated

with African countries, including [eritrea.news-pravda.com](http://eritrea.news-pravda.com), [gambia.news-pravda.com](http://gambia.news-pravda.com), [burkina-faso.news-pravda.com](http://burkina-faso.news-pravda.com), and others—particularly in the context of news about the recognition of Kosovo's statehood by countries like Kenya and Sudan. This global reach is facilitated by English-language versions on these domains, making the content accessible to an international audience and amplifying the platform's narratives beyond the Balkans.



## CONCLUSION

In-depth research into the “Pravda” network, particularly its expansion in the Balkan region through state-affiliated domains, reveals a sophisticated propaganda and disinformation operation with clear links to the Kremlin. The network primarily functions through the automated distribution of content sourced from Russian state media and Telegram channels, which is then automatically translated into various Balkan languages. Analysis of content published between April 2024 and April 2025 on the Albanian-language domain shows a pronounced focus on pro-Russian and pro-Serbian narratives, strong criticism of NATO, the EU, and the US, and a denialist stance on Kosovo’s independence—aiming to shape Albanian public opinion through manipulative and polarizing messaging. The “Pravda” domain network disseminates content about Kosovo not only via regional sites but also through global domains, including those associated with African countries. This broader reach is facilitated by English-language versions of these sites, targeting an international audience.

However, despite its extensive efforts to influence, the “Pravda” network’s impact on the Albanian-speaking audience remains negligible. This is largely due to poor-quality automated translations, absence from the major social media platforms popular among Albanians, ineffective SEO strategies, and very low organic traffic. While the network possesses a strong technical infrastructure for distributing disinformation across the Balkans—especially targeting Serbia—its direct influence within the Albanian-speaking community remains minimal.





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