Based on the treatment of misinformation content in recent political processes, this text analyzes possible misinformation narratives that may appear until the end of the deadline for electing the president of Kosovo.
To raise awareness of this content, a combined prebunking approach was used, relying on identifying previous patterns of misinformation, presenting verified facts about current developments, and mentioning the narratives and sources through which misinformation can spread. This approach aims to help readers understand not only which claims may be inaccurate, but also how and why they may appear.
Political situation that can encourage misinformation
The presidential election process comes after a busy cycle of political developments, including the parliamentary elections of February 9, 2025 and the early elections of December 28, 2025. Kosovo is in the process of electing a president and in the event of an inconclusive election, the country risks going to early elections. Based on continuous monitoring by hibrid.info, such unclear institutional situations pose an increased risk for the circulation of misinformation, especially regarding political developments and institutional decision-making (see here and here).
Misinformation in the past
Last year (2025), two sets of parliamentary elections were held: regular elections on February 9 and early elections on December 28, as a result of the failure of the legislature to form executive institutions in the first elections.
During the period between the announcement of the mandate to form the government (October 11, 2025) and the setting of the election date (November 20), hibrid.info addressed several allegations related to political developments.
Some of this content created false connections between opposition parties and the Serbian List or exponents close to this political entity, claiming collaboration to block political processes (see here, here, here and here). In other cases, claims of unconfirmed coalition agreements have been published (see here, here and here) or for securing votes to form a government (see here and here).
Also, content in Serbian was identified that linked political developments in Kosovo with narratives of instability or security risk (see here).
Misinformation addressed in the current situation
Since the beginning of the process of electing the country's president (March 5, 2026), hibrid.info has addressed a series of misinformation content related to developments and political actors involved in this issue.
These include manipulated statements by political officials and false attributions of political positions (here here, here and here), superlative or fabricated publications about public figures (see here, here, here, here and here), image manipulation (here and here), fake polls that claim to show political support (see here and here) and false claims about the name of the new president (here and here).
This shows that even in the current situation, familiar patterns of misinformation from previous political periods are being repeated.
Facts from the current situation in the country
March 5 was the deadline for the Kosovo Assembly to begin procedures for electing the head of state, because the term of the then president, Vjosa Osmani, ended on April 4.
To begin voting for president, according to Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, at least 80 MPs had to be present at the session. Two of the opposition parties (the Democratic Party of Kosovo and the Democratic League of Kosovo) had requested a preliminary agreement on the presidential vote. Although political leaders of both parties held meetings with the Prime Minister and the leader of the Vetëvendosje Movement, Albin Kurti, no agreement was reached on the issue (see here).
However, the Vetëvendosje Movement proposed two candidacies (Glauk Konjufca and Fatmire Kollqaku) that came from the ranks of this entity, but the opposition parties did not remain in the hall during the voting.
For this reason, the Speaker of the Assembly, Albulena Haxhiu, adjourned the session due to the lack of a quorum (see here).
The next day (March 6), Vjosa Osmani, the president still in office, appeared at a press conference and said that she had issued a decree to dissolve the Assembly, since according to her, the country’s representatives “decided to take the country to elections”. She justified the decision with Article 86 of the Constitution of Kosovo, which stipulates that “The election of the President of the Republic of Kosovo must take place no later than thirty (30) days before the end of the mandate of the current President”. The decree was sent to the Constitutional Court by the Government of Kosovo and the deputies of the LVV (see here).
The highest legal institution on March 26 published the judgment on the assessment of the constitutionality of this decree, finding that it did not produce any legal effect and that the deputies of the Assembly of Kosovo have 34 days from the date of entry into force of this judgment to develop and complete the procedure for electing the president (see here).
The judgment further stated that if the Assembly fails to elect the president within this specified period, the Assembly shall be dissolved and early elections for the Assembly shall be held within 45 days.
MPs have until April 28 to elect the country's president. Since the Constitutional Court's decision, only one meeting has been held on the issue of the president between Albin Kurti, the country's prime minister, and Lumir Abdixhiku, the leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK). The meeting produced no results (see here).
Sources and possible narratives of misinformation
Based on cases handled in similar situations and the current situation, it is expected that content that follows similar patterns will circulate until the end of the presidential election period.
Posts claiming that "A secret agreement has been reached to elect the president.” or that suggest covert political collaborations, are usually published without verifiable sources. In these cases, the lack of official statements and confirmations from relevant actors is an indication that the claim is unfounded and should be treated with caution.
Also, publications may circulate claiming that the votes are "already provided"or that the process is completed ahead of timeThese claims are often accompanied by anonymous sources or without concrete references and aim to create a false perception of political developments. Verification in official sources and credible reporting is essential in these cases.
In other cases, shortened videos or statements taken out of context may circulate, accompanied by descriptions that change their meaning. If a statement is not published in full and from the original source, there is a possibility that it has been manipulated.
Also, publications that present POLL for political support or that claim to name the next president, without citing clear sources and verifiable methodologies, should be viewed with suspicion, as they often aim to influence public perception.
In Serbian language content, claims may appear that present the situation as unstable or a security risk, without being based on concrete facts. These narratives usually use alarmist language to create a sense of uncertainty among the public.
In all these cases, the common elements are the lack of reliable sources, the use of speculative language, and the presentation of information without full context.
conclusion
Based on these examples, it can be predicted that misinformation content may be published in the coming days from unreliable sources.
Therefore, in such cases, it is important to check the source of the information, assess its credibility and compare it with other reliable sources. Attention should also be paid to the context and time of publication.
Verifying information through official sources and critically analyzing claims helps avoid the impact of misinformation and create a more accurate understanding of political developments.