During the monitoring of the misinformation sphere during the period September 14–19, 2026, it was found that disinformation was the most prevalent category of misinformation, while cases of manipulation of facts, clickbait, fraud, fake news, and unverified content were also identified.
During this period, misinformation content was mainly published on social networks, especially on Facebook, TikTok and Telegram, while some of the claims were also published or amplified by Serbian-language portals. A significant part of the cases focused on the September 16 verdict against former KLA leaders at the Kosovo Specialist Chambers in The Hague. In other cases, old statements, institutional announcements and manipulated materials were used to create incorrect interpretations.
Disinformation was identified in five cases. In some of them, unfounded claims were made about the outcome of the verdict, while in other cases, statements by analysts were presented as positions of politicians, or events that were not part of the judicial process were presented as such. Another case related to the protest in Tirana, which was presented in some media as a protest caused by the verdict in The Hague, although Albanian media reports linked the protest to internal political developments in Albania.
Manipulation of facts was evidenced in three cases. One of them related to the allegations of attacks on buses in Kosovo in 1999 and 2001, where the facts of two documented events were presented in a distorted manner. Two other cases concerned security measures before September 16. In one case, Kosovo Police measures were presented as an indication that former KLA leaders would be severely punished, while in the other a US Embassy notice to avoid demonstration areas was presented as a general call for citizens not to send their children to school.
Clickbait was identified in three cases. One headline about the increase in the minimum wage in Montenegro did not specify the country, while two other cases related to old statements by Ganimete Musliu and Hashim Thaçi's lawyer, which were republished on the days of the verdict, creating the impression that they were about reactions or new developments.
The fraud was documented in two cases. One video used real footage from the trial in The Hague, but combined it with artificial intelligence-generated audio, which was presented as witness testimony. In the other case, a photo of a 2022 protest was manipulated by changing the text on a banner.
Fake news was identified in a case related to the claim that Austrian media had positively evaluated Albin Kurti. While unverified content was identified in a claim about the boycott of the Kosovo National Team by several footballers.
disinformation
An image was posted on TikTok claiming that only two of the four former KLA leaders would be released on September 16 and that there would be a “civil war” in Kosovo. Before the verdict was announced, the Specialist Chambers had only announced the date and time of the verdict and had not announced the outcome of the trial. Even the warnings from the Kosovo Police and other institutions for September 16 were related to security measures and demonstrations, and not to any confirmed information about the outcome of the trial (see here).
A claim was published on Telegram that Albin Kurti had agreed that Hashim Thaçi would become president of Kosovo if he were released by the Specialist Chambers. Verification showed that a similar statement was made by political analyst Xhavit Drenori on 12 September, who had expressed his opinion on what could happen in the event of Thaçi’s release. No evidence was found that Kurti had made such a statement or agreement. It was also not confirmed that Albanian-language media had reported on such an agreement on 16 September (see here).
Another piece of content posted on Facebook on the day the verdict was announced presented the murder of Xhemajl Mustafa as if it were part of the Hague ruling. The post stated that “13 years for the murder of Xhemajl Mustafa is not enough”, creating the impression that Rexhep Selim’s 13-year sentence was related to this murder. However, Mustafa’s murder was not part of the trial in The Hague and the verdict does not convict Selim for this crime (see here).
In some Serbian-language media, the September 17 protest in Tirana was presented as a protest caused by the verdict against the former KLA leaders. Verification of Albanian media reports showed that the protest was part of a series of protests against the government of Edi Rama, while clashes with police occurred after protesters attempted to break through police barriers. In the same period, there were also reactions in Albania regarding the verdict in The Hague, but no evidence was found that the September 17 clashes were caused by the court's decision (see here).
Another case related to a publication in which the statement of Hashim Thaçi’s lawyer, Luka Misetić, “Hashim Thaçi is innocent,” was presented as “the latest news from The Hague.” In fact, the statement was made during the closing arguments of the defense on February 11, 2026, and did not constitute a decision of the Specialist Chambers on Thaçi’s innocence. The content was published on the eve of the verdict, creating the impression that it was a new judicial development (see here).
Manipulation of facts
John Bosnitch published claims about two attacks on buses in Kosovo, linking them to NATO and presenting inaccurate figures on victims and perpetrators. In the case of Lluzhan, NATO had admitted that the bus had been hit during an airstrike on a bridge, but the casualty figures presented by Bosnitch did not match the documented sources. As for the attack in Livadicë, the bus had been hit by an explosive device and Florim Ejupi was initially convicted of terrorism, but the conviction was later overturned by the Supreme Court due to insufficient evidence. No evidence was found that NATO had supported the attack (see here).
A Facebook post by the “Kosova Report” page used announcements about Kosovo Police security measures prior to September 16 to claim that the former KLA leaders were likely to be severely punished. Verification of the Kosovo Police announcements showed that the measures were related to the management of demonstrations, the possibility of gatherings, and the prevention of incidents. These announcements did not state that the Police had information about the outcome of the verdict or that the four former leaders would be severely punished (see here).
A Facebook post claimed that the US Embassy in Pristina had urged Kosovo citizens not to send their children to school on September 16. The Embassy’s announcement of the planned demonstrations stated that citizens should avoid areas where protests were taking place and limit travel if roads passed through affected areas. The advice not to send children to school was directed at US Government personnel, due to potential traffic disruptions, and not to all Kosovo citizens (see here).
Clickbait
The Facebook pages “Trendi.info”, “Gazeta 114” and “Gazeta Diaspora” published captions stating “From January 1, minimum wage up to 1400 euros”, without indicating that they were referring to Montenegro. According to official announcements from this country, from January 2027 the minimum net wage is expected to be between 1,000 and 1,400 euros, depending on the level of education. The lack of a country designation in the caption could create the impression that it was a decision in Kosovo (see here).
A statement by Ganimete Musliu, made on 9 September 2026, was republished on 16 September, the day the verdict was announced in The Hague. The statement used the phrase “Now you will see the actions of the PDK”, creating the possibility that it could be understood as her reaction to the decision. However, the statement had been made a week earlier and was related to political and institutional developments in Kosovo, not to the verdict in The Hague (see here).
Lies
A video was published on Facebook where real footage from the trial in The Hague was combined with an audio in Serbian, which was presented as the testimony of a witness against Hashim Thaçi and the KLA. The footage was from the testimony of Ismet Tara, known as Commander Hoxha, while no credible source was found documenting the statement included in the audio. Analyses conducted using AI-generated content identification tools assessed the audio with a high probability as artificially generated (see here).
A photo of a 2022 protest was posted on TikTok with a banner reading “Whoever is against the court is against Kosovo.” Verification showed that the photo was from the December 24, 2022 protest organized by the PSD against the sentencing of Sali Mustafa. In the original photo, the banner read “Not in my name,” while the text was changed in the version posted on TikTok (see here).
Fake news
Several Facebook pages published the claim that Austrian media had positively assessed Albin Kurti, presenting him as the leader with the highest rating in the Balkans and in part of Europe, as well as attributing to him other assessments regarding corruption and Kosovo's sovereignty. The publications did not specify which Austrian media had made these statements, and no reporting was found in the requested media that supported these claims in the form presented (see here).
Unverified content
The claim that six other Kosovo footballers would boycott the national team until Agim Ademi was removed from the position of FFK president was published on the X platform. The claim was later shared on Facebook and in a Serbian-language media outlet. However, Arijanet Muriç and Florent Muslija denied having made such a decision, while the author of the initial claim admitted that the information regarding Muriç was incorrect. For this reason, the claim was not confirmed by reliable sources (see here).